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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO
===========~=====================-================

MICHAEL SCOTT MACLAY,
PETITIONER-APPELLANT,
VS.

IDAHO REAL EST ATE COMMISSION,
RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT ON APPEAL.

=============================================--========
AppealedFoln the District Court oJthe Fourth Judicial
District oJthe State of Idaho, in a/1(IJor ADA County

Hon KA THR YN A. STICKLEN, District Judge

MICHAEL S. MACLAY
Appellant Pro Se

KIRTLAN G, NAYLOR
Attorney for Respondent
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MICHAEL SCOTT MACLAY,
Supreme Court Case No.3 7946
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.

IDAHO REAL ESTATE COMMISSION,
Respondent-Respondent on Appeal.

CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL

Appeal trom the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada.

HONORABLE KATHRYN A. STICKLEN

MICHAEL S. MACLAY

KIRTLAN G. NAYLOR

APPELLANT PRO SE

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

SPOKANE VALLEY, WASHINGTON

BOISE, IDAHO
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Case: CV-OC-2009-07296 Current Judge: Kathryn A. Sticklen
Michael Scott Maclay vs. Idaho Real Estate Commission

Michael Scott Maclay vs. Idaho Real Estate Commission
Date

Code

User

4/17/2009

NCOC

CCGARDAL

New Case Filed - Other Claims

Kathryn A. Sticklen

PETN

CCGARDAL

Petition for Judicial Review

Kathryn A. Sticklen

MISC

CCGARDAL

Declaration of Service

Kathryn A. Sticklen

4/27/2009

NOAP

CCTOWNRD

Notice Of Appearance (Kirtlan Naylor for
Respondent)

Kathryn A. Stick len

4/28/2009

OGAP

DCTYLENI

Order Governing Judicial Review

Kathryn A. Stick len

5/7/2009

NOTC

CCWRIGRM

Notice of Lodging of Agency Record Proceedings Not Transcribed

Kathryn A. Sticklen

5/29/2009

NOTC

MCBIEHKJ

Notice of Filing Agency Record

Kathryn A. Sticklen

MISC

MCBIEHKJ

Agency Record

Kathryn A. Stick len

6/1/2009

OBJE

CCBURGBL

Objection to Motion for Order Authorizing
Payment of Transcript

Kathryn A. Sticklen

6/9/2009

MOTN

CCAMESLC

Motion for Order Authorizing Payment of the
Kathryn A. Sticklen
Transcript from District Court Funds and
Objection to Notice of Lodging of Agency Record

MISC

CCAMESLC

Declaration of Michael Scott Maclay

Kathryn A. Sticklen

DECL

CCANDEJD

Declaration Filed of Michael Scott Maclay

Kathryn A. Sticklen

MOTN

CCANDEJD

Motion for an Order Authorizing Payment of the
Kathryn A. Sticklen
Transcript from District Court Funds and
Objection to Notice of Lodging of Agency Record

6/26/2009

ORDR

DCTYLENI

Order Denying Motion for an Order Authorizing
Payment of Transcript from the District Court
Funds (21 days to reply)

Kathryn A. Stick len

7/16/2009

AFFD

MCBIEHKJ

Affidavit of Michael Scott Maclay

Kathryn A. Sticklen

AFFD

CCBOYIDR

Affidavit

Kathryn A. Sticklen

8/28/2009

ORDR

DCTYLENI

Order Re: Payment of Transcript Fee

Kathryn A. Sticklen

8/31/2009

OBJC

CCSIMMSM

Supplement to Respondent's Objection to
Petitioner's Motion for An Order Authorizing
Payment of the Transcript from District Court
Funds and Objection to Notice of Lodging of
Agency Record

Kathryn A. Sticklen

10/6/2009

REPT

CCBOYIDR

Report on Bankruptcy and Motion to Dismiss
Petitioner's Petition for Judicial Review

Kathryn A. Sticklen

10/7/2009

NOTC

CCBOURPT

Notice of Lodging Transcript

Kathryn A. Sticklen

10/22/2009

RSPN

CCSIMMSM

Petitioner's Response to Motion to Dismiss
Petition for Judicial Review

Kathryn A. Sticklen

RSPN

CCBOYIDR

Petitioners' Response to Motion to Dismiss
Petition for Judicial Review

Kathryn A. Sticklen

10/23/2009

ORDR

DCTYLENI

Conditional Order Dismissing Petition for Judicial Kathryn A. Sticklen
Review

10/27/2009

HRSC

CCAMESLC

Notice of Hearing (Motion to Dismiss
11/13/200903:00 PM)

Kathryn A. Sticklen

10/30/2009

MOTN

MCBIEHKJ

Motion for Reconsideration

Kathryn A. Sticklen

Judge
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Case: CV-OC-2009-07296 Current Judge: Kathryn A. Stick len
Michael Scott Maclay vs. Idaho Real Estate Commission

Michael Scott Maclay vs. Idaho Real Estate Commission
Date

Code

User

11/13/2009

DCHH

CCCHILER

Kathryn A. Sticklen
Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss held on
11/13/200903:00 PM: District Court Hearing Hel<
Court Reporter: Penny Tardiff
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 100

BREF

CCPRICDL

Petitoner's Brief in Support of Petition for Judical
Review

Kathryn A. Sticklen

MOTN

CCBOYIDR

Respondent's Motion to Stay Briefing Schedule

Kathryn A. Sticklen

MOTN

CC5DYIDR

Respondent's Motion to Dismiss

Kathryn A. Sticklen

12/4/2009

RSPN

CCWRIGRM

Petitioners Response to Respondents Motion to
Dismiss

Kathryn A. Sticklen

12/15/2009

BREF

CCAMESLC

Respondent's Reply Brief Regarding Motion to
Dismiss

Kathryn A. Sticklen

BREF

CCAMESLC

Respondent's Reply Brief Regarding Motion to
Stay

Kathryn A. Sticklen

12/18/2009

MISC

MCBIEHKJ

Declaration of Michael Scott Maclay

Kathryn A. Sticklen

1/27/2010

DEOP

DCTYLENI

Memorandum Decision and Order

Kathryn A. Sticklen

2/26/2010

BREF

CCWATSCL

Respondent Idaho Real Estate Commission's
Reply Brief to Petitioner's Petition for Judicial
Review

Kathryn A. Sticklen

3/18/2010

REPL

MCBIEHKJ

Reply to Response Brief

Kathryn A. Sticklen

4/12/2010

MISC

DCTYLENI

Reply to Response Brief (Notice of Hearing
5/17/10 @ 3:30 p.m.)

Kathryn A. Sticklen

4/15/2010

HRSC

DCTYLENI

Amended Notice of Hearing- Scheduled (Oral
Argument on Appeal 05/18/201003:30 PM)

Kathryn A. Sticklen

5/1812010

HRHD

CCGARDAL

Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal held
on 05/18/2010 03:30 PM: Hearing Held
No Court Reporter Present

Kathryn A. Sticklen

6/2812010

DEOP

DCTYLENI

Memorandum Decision and Order

Kathryn A. Sticklen

CD IS

DCTYLENI

Civil Disposition entered for: Idaho Real Estate
Commission, Defendant; Maclay, Michael Scott,
Plaintiff. Filing date: 6/28/2010

Kathryn A. Stick len

STAT

DCTYLENI

STATUS CHANGED: Closed

Kathryn A. Sticklen

APSC

CCTHIEBJ

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Kathryn A. Sticklen

MOTN

CCTHIEBJ

Motion For Order To Waive Notice Of Appeal
Filing Fees, Cost For Record And Cost For
Transcripts

Kathryn A. Sticklen

AFFD

CCTHIEBJ

Affidavit Of Michael Scott Maclay

Kathryn A. Sticklen

ORDR

DCTYLENI

Order for Waiver of Costs on Appeal (Filing Fee
and Clerk's Record waived)

Kathryn A. Sticklen

11/23/2009

8/6/2010

8/20/2010

Judge
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IN THE DISTRiCT COURT OF THE 4th JUDICiAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

Estate

a broker, John Runkle,

worked

broker,
the Idaho

JUDiCiAL REVIEW- 1
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it

made a

00006

requesting the

IS

of all

that

have

has

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL

issues on

use

violated

property

1

the

00007

under

facts, Petitioner violated Idaho Code
through a broker
crux of

IS

a

consistently failed to understand or
property is not an
facts, Petitioner violated
and

course of

under

that
a transcript

UUI'<vC;

available
or due process

principles~

presented
not address or acknowledge
its
did not even have

by
Its

REViEW-4
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the use of a private attorney was appropriate
who now seeks

have Petitioner

liable

MICHAEL SCOTT MACLA¥,
PETITIONER
N.

the above entitled lJc.flt.nn
Petition for Judicial Review are true and correct to the best
of
2009.

to

me this ..1-.-_ _

JUDICIAL REVIEW-
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

MICHAEL SCOTT MACLAY,
Petitioner,

Case No. CVOC0907296

vs.

ORDER GOVERNING
JUDICIAL REVIEW

IDAHO REAL ESTATE COMMISSION,
Respondent.

Petition for Judicial Review having been filed herein, and it appearing that the
issues presented on appeal are questions of law and fact; and it further appearing that a
record/transcript is necessary to process this appeal:
It is ORDERED:
1) That upon completion of the record the agency shall mail or deliver a notice of
lodging of transcript and record to all attorneys of record or parties appearing in person
and to the district court.
2) That the notice shall inform the parties before the agency that they pick up a
copy of the transcript and record at the agency and that the parties have fourteen (14)
days from the date of the mailing of the notice in which to file with the agency any
objections, and the notice will further advise the petitioner to pay the balance of the fees
for preparation before the transcript and record will be delivered to the petitioner.

ORDER GOVERNING JUDICIAL REVIEW - Page 1

00010

3) That the Agency shall transmit the settled transcript and record to the district
court within forty-two (42) days of the service of the petition for judicial review.
4) That the Agency, upon filing with the Court the record, shall send notice of
such filing to all parties;
5) That the Petitioner's brief shall be filed and served within thirty-five (35) days of
the date the transcript and record are filed with the Court.
6) That the Respondent's brief shall be filed and served within twenty-eight (28)
days after service of Petitioner's brief.
7) That Petitioner's reply brief, if any, shall be filed and served within twenty-one
(21) days after service of Respondent's brief.
8) That either party may notice the matter for oral argument after all briefs are
filed, and that if within fourteen (14) days after the final brief is filed, neither party does so
notice for oral argument, the Court will deem oral argument waived and decide the case
on the briefs and the record.
th

Dated this 28 day of April, 2009.

KATHRYN STICKLEN
Senior District Judge

ORDER GOVERNING JUDICIAL REVIEW - Page 2
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this 28

th

day of April, 2009, I mailed (served) a true and

correct copy of the within instrument to:

KIRTLAN G. NAYLOR
NAYLOR & HALES, PC
950 W BANNOCK, STE 610
BOISE, ID 83702
MICHAEL SCOTT MACLAY
PETITIONER (PROSE)
3304 N. PARK ROAD
SPOKANE VALLEY, WA 99212

J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Court
(~~' .', I

r

By:

\

\ i\,J

\

'

n0jt/ //

j\i'~~\ /
t,

Beputy Court Cler<

ORDER GOVERNING JUDICIAL REVIEW - Page 3
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Kirtlan G. Naylor
[ISB No. 3569]
NAYLOR & HALES, P.c.
Attorneys at Law
950 W. Bannock Street. Ste. 610
Boise. lD 83702
Telephone No. (208) 383-9511
Facsimile No. (208) 383-9516
Attorneys for Respondent

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
MICHAEL SCOTT MACLAY.
Case No. CV -OC-2009-07296
Petitioner,

REPORT ON BANKRUPTCY AND
MOTION TO DISMISS PETITIONER'S
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

vs.

IDAHO STATE REAL ESTATE
COMMISSION,
Respondent.

Respondent, by and through its attorneys of record. Naylor & Hales. P.c.. gives notice
to the Court that eertain documents filed by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern
District of Washington (In Re Michael Scott lvlaclay, Case No. 09-02717-PCW). related to
Petitioner's pleadings for a finding of indigency are attached hereto as Exhibits "A" and "B."
Respondent requests the Court take judicial notice of these court filings, and in consideration of the
fact that Petitioner's bankruptcy has been dismissed, reconsider this Court's finding of indigency.
Should the Petitioner fail to no\\" pay the Court reporting fees for the transcript lodged
with the Agency. Respondent requests that this Court dismiss the Petition for Judicial Review for

REPORT ON BANKRUPTCY AND MOTION TO DISMISS
RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - 1.

00013

failure to prosecute pursuant to l.R.C.P. 84(n). Rule

84~n)

provides that when a party fails to timely

take any step in the proceedings, it may be grounds for a sanction, including a dismissal of the
petition for judicial review.
No oral argument is requested.

Respectfully submitted this 5th day of October. 2009.
NAYLOR & HALES, P.c.

By ________~----____-----------------Kirtlan G. Naylor, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 5th day of October. 2009, I caused to be served. by
the method(s) indicated. a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon:
Michael S. Maclay
3304 N. Park Road
Spokane Valley, W A 99212
Petitioner

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Federal Express
Fax Transmission

Kimberly A. Coster
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Real Estate Commission
633 N. 4th Street
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, 10 83720-0077

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
E-Mail: kim.coster:ihrec.idaho.~O\
Fax Transmission
334-2050
C)

....

Kirtlan G. Naylor
M:\IRFc\Mada). rvllchad 'Scolt'\Judiciul Review Casel7449_ 05 Report on BK. Motion to Dismiss ['dillon liJI JudiCIal Rc\ Icw.\\pd

REPORT ON BANKRUPTCY AND MOTION TO DISMISS
RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - 2.

l)0014

09-02717 -PCW13

36

Filed 09/30109

Entered 09/3

14:55:34

Pg 1 of 1

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
In rc

Case N umber

09-02717-PCW

Michael Scott Maclay

Chapter

13

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Debtor( s )

THJS MATTER came on for hearing before the Honorable Patricia C. Williams on September 29, 2009 on
the confirmation of the Chapter 13 Plan. Debtor's counsel made an Oral Motion to Dismi ss the Chapter 13
Case. The Co urt reviewed the files and records herein, and was fully advised in the premises.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
I. The debtor's counsel, Elizabeth Heath, made an oral Motion to Dismiss the case.
2 . The Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and the above-referenced Chapter 13 case is he reby DISMISSED.

~(lk/~

Patricia C. Williams

Bankruptcy Judge

09/30/2009 11: 3 2:47

0001-5
ORDER OF DlSi\IISSAL
U" . 11~71

: .I..... I J • .!.PC\ \ nl"l.1o:l" "Ihlll< ~ . I . I'! 5..1~t.J:!lil . h ITGJ..I I::

EXHIBIT A

09-02717 -PCVV13

0

Filed 09/30/09

Entered 09/3 "'9 14:55:34

Pg 1 of 1
Form ntcdsm
Rev 06/22/2009

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
In re:

Case Number: 09-02717-PCW13

Michael Scott Maclay
(Debtor)

Chapter: 13
NOTICE OF DISMISSAL

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that an Order Dismissing the above-entitled case was signed on September
30,2009 and entered on the case docket on September 30,2009.

Date: September 30, 2009

CLERK OF COURT

lsI Nydia Urlacher
Deputy Clerk

000lf;
EXHIBIT B

11/13/2009

2

3

13:34

THE UPS

02/0'3

ichael Scott Maclay
etitioner (Pro Se)
304 N. Park Road
pokane Valley, WA 99212

509) 714-7974

4

5
6
7

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 4th JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

8

9
10
11

Michael Scott Maclay,

Case No. CVOC0907296
Petitioner
vs.

PETITIONER'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
Idaho Real Estate Commission,

12

Res ondent

13

14
15
16

17

Petitioner, MICHAEL SCOTT MACLAY, presents the following memorandum 0
oints and authorities in support of his Petition for Judicial Review.

Petitioner als

equests that a date and time be set by this Court for oral arguments on thi
atter.

INTRODUCTION: STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

18

19

20

Hundreds of years ago, the term "witch hunt" arose from the Salem Witch Trial
o describe an overzealous pursuit of a perceived wrongdoer, with a frequent and fairl
IIous disregard for facts supporting

a person's innocence. In the 1950's, during th

21

cCarthy era, many lives were ruined on accusations alone. Sadly. it is human natur

22

o draw inferences from an initial "perception" of facts, and then, once conclusions ar

23

eached, the search becomes one of focusing on those facts that support the conclusio
nd conveniently ignoring those that do not. We have all been victims of this kind 0

24

ersecution at one time or another in our lives.

25

etitiouer's Brief Supporting judicial Review - 1

Our legal system is supposed t

26

27

12

00017

11/13/2009

13:34
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THE UPS'

nvestigate and consider facts dispassionately. Rather than duels and other "tit for tat'
2

eans of resolving disputes, we turn to impartial tribunals to settle differences. Wit
ope and optimism, Petitioner looks to this Court to finally and fully review the agenc

3

ecord-including Petitioner's testimony in his deposition and at the hearing, as well a

4

etitioners exhibits, (Marked in the Agency Record as A-G). If all the evidence is take

5

nto consideration, it will be clear that Petitioner was at all times acting in good faith wi
determined effort to abide by the rules-no matter how gray some of them are---an

6

o provide a valuable and desired marketing service to Idaho citizens. There certainly i

7

o pattern of misconduct, dishonesty, recklessness, or deceit. Petitioner came to Idaho,
anting to use the same marketing program that he had been using for years i

8

ashington. He was open and upfront about this, and initially his broker. John Runkle,

9

as in agreement. Mr. Runkle's name as broker, and his signature, appears on virtuall

10

very Seller's Representation Agreement that contained a flat fee for marketin
rrangement. Mr. Runkle even sent his Idaho agents to Washington to work for the rea

11
12
13

state company, Family First, that also employed Petitioner. Jerry Webb, the Famil
irst Broker, clearly states this in his letter to the Idaho Real Estate Commission,
"Commission~),

(Respondent's Exhibit 1).

Curiously, the Commission chose not t

ursue a deposition or any other means of verifying Mr. Webb's letter.
14

15

16

It is fair to say that

~but

for" the so called verified complaint of John Runkle an

is struggle with Petitioner's flat fee marketing program, the Commission would no
ave pursued its case with such intensity. The Administrative Hearing Officer did no

17

18
19

ive any weight to Mr. Webb's letter, or the letter of attorney and Idaho broker, Georg
ucera (Petitioner's Exhibit "A), or the inconSistency of Mr. Runkle's statement that h
id not learn of the flat fee marketing program until September of 2006, when the fact
learly show that he, or his authorized representative, Steve Ayles, was signing th

20

eller Representation Agreements that included up front flat fee marketing fees a

21

roker, (See Respondent's Exhibits 4, 5, and 6). Only the Smith Seller Representatio

22

greement, (Respondent's Exhibit 3) was not signed by Mr. Runkle.

The Smit

greement was executed through Real Team in Washington and there is no eviden
23

hat Petitioner received any marketing fee from this Agreement

24

nvolved with this Agreement.

25

etitioner's Brief Supporting Judicial Review - 2

Petitioner was no

The Agreements shown as Exhibits 4,5, and 6, were al

26

27

00018
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13: 34

1

THE UPS

ntered into prior to September of 2006. So how could Mr. Runkle honestly say he di

2

ot know about Petitioner's upfront flat fee marketing program before then? Doesn'
his weaken Mr. Runkle's credibility?

Yet, incredibly, the Hearing Officer failed t

3

ddress these facts in her Findings of Fact. If a person considers something but the

4

hooses to disregard it in reaching a conclusion, would not logic dictate that he or she a

5

east address the question of why these facts were not persuasive?

6

In his deposition, Mr. Runkle, (pgs 25-29 of Runkle's deposition) essentially say

7

hat he does not know what he was signing, when answering the question of whether h
new about the upfront marketing fees charged by Petitioner before September 2006.

8

hat kind of responsible broker would admit that he just signed whatever crossed hi

9

10
In his letter to Scott Maclay dated March 1, 2006, (Petitioner's Exhibit A), Idah
11

raker and attorney, George Kucera, gives a sensible definition and distinction betwee

12

arketing fees that are not related to the perfonnance of any act requiring a real estat

13

icense in the State of Idaho and the "completion" of acts requiring a real estate license.
ere you have a broker who is perfectly willing, as many brokers in Washington are an

14

15
16

ere, to allow an agent to charge a marketing fee for non real estate agent acts withou
nning this fee through the brokerage. Simply noting the fee on the Listing Agreemen
as acceptable to this Idaho broker. Even Mr. Morse, the Commission's investigato
ays that there is a gray area (Transcript pages 119-120) between up front marketin

17
18

19

ees paid to the agent who is providing the marketing and then further real estat
icensee acts the compensation for which must go through the brokerage. When yo
ave a gray area of the law, and particularly when you have confusion amongst broker
ith one accepting it and one not accepting it, and you have a practice that has bee

20

uccessfully doing it in another state for many years, and when you are up front an

21

pen about it, how can an unbiased evaluator of facts conclude that Petitioner wa

22
23

cting recklessly or engaging in a pattern of deceit and misconduct?
Petitioner tried to point out these relevant facts and grayness of the law both a

24

he Administrative Hearing (see Transcript of Petitioners opening statement an

25

eritioner's Brief Supporting Judicial Review - 3

26
27
000l~)

ll/13/2fJ0'3

13: 34

THE UPS

PAGE

05/09

xhibits) and through his retained counsel's Memorandum in Support of a Motion fo

:2

econsideration ( Item #7 on the Index of Agency Record), yet without addressing an
pecifies, the Hearing Officer simply states "all arguments set forth in the Memorandu

3

ere already considered

4

ecommended Order." (Item 9 of Agency Record, pg.1).

5

in the Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law an
A careful review of th

indings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order shows that the Hearin
Icer failed to address specifically any of Petitioner's exhibits including the letter fro

6

eorge Kucera, the inconsistency between Jerry Webb's letter (Respondent's Exhib'

7

), the facts showing Mr. Runkle's awareness and approval of the upfront marketin
ees being paid directly to Petitioner prior to September 2006.

8

9
10

In its Final Order, the Commission adopted the Hearing Officer's Findings in thei
ntirety.
e~ow,

)1

Petitioner intends to address the other conclusions by the Hearing Office

but it is critical to a fair review of this case, that the Hearing Officer's glarin

mission of the facts supporting Petitioner's good faith activities related to the marketin

12

ees be corrected. At a minimum this case should be remanded with instructions to th

13

earing Officer to state why she was not troubled by Mr. Runkle's signature on th
isting Agreements, prior to September 2006, or why she gave no probative value to th

14

15

etters of Jerry Webb and/or George Kucera concerning the issue of the upfron
arketing fees paid to Petitioner.

16

It is also a regrettable and curious omission for the Hearing Officer to fail t
17

18
19

ddress the exhibits presented by Petitioner of his correspondence with Help-U-Sel
Petitioners Exhibits B, E, and F) following the death of George Kucera in which h
elieved that he was waiting for Help-U-Sell to transfer the Idaho franchise to him
uring the period in question, October 31, 2007 through December of 2007, it appear

20

hat at least one individual in Help-U-SeUs Corporate office, Erik Mower, was dealin

21

itf') Petitioner on the level of telling him to be patient because "some files tha

22

n1'ortunately were not transferred over to us". Certainly, it shows that Petitioner wa
eing led, in good faith, to believe that the transfer of the Help-U-Sell franchise in Idah

23

rom George Kucera was "in the works".

24

25

etitioncr' 5 Brief Supporting Judicial Review· 4

26

27

00020

11/13/20[19

1:3:34

1

THE UPS.·

FLAT FEE MARKETING FEES ARE NOT REQUIRED
TO BE PAID THROUGH THE REAL ESTATE BROKER

2
3
4

As stated in the Introduction, this is the crux of this whole case. Is John Runkl
ny different than George Kucera in terms of their status as Brokers in the State
daho_ One Broker concludes that marketing fees must be paid through his firm and

5

0
0

he other does not. Both brokers, as well as Petitioner, agree that the marketing fee

6

hould be, and in this case, were disclosed to the Sellers on the Listing Agreement

7

ithout giving regard to George Kucera's letter, John Runkle's tacit consent of the fee
s evidenced by his signature on four of the five listing agreements, or even to th

8

9
10

estimony of Don Morse-the Commission's own investigator-that this is a gray area

0

he law, the Hearing Officer erred in concluding on page 17 of the Findings of Fact
onclusions of Law, and Recommended Order (#2 of Agency Record) that Petitione
ad violated Idaho Code Section 54-2054 (9). Petitioner accepted a marketing fee, wit

11

he consent of his broker, John Runkle. Any other services as a real estate agent fo

12

he clients involved were to be paid-upon completion of a sale-by a commission tha

13

ould have been paid through the brokerage. In addition. arguably, the marketing fe
as paid through the brokerage (as Mr. Kucera suggests in his letter) with the simpl

14
J5

16

act that the broker had knowledge of the fee and it was disclosed in the Listin
greement.

Instead of a violation of Idaho Real Estate law, really what you have her

s a difference of opinion between a broker and his agent

Yes, the relationshi

robably needed to be severed, but it is a significant, unsupported stretch to go fro

17

]8
19

here to a conclusion that the agent is violating Idaho real estate law and "engaging in
ntinued or flagrant course of misrepresentation or making false promises, .. an
ngaging in dishonest or dishonorable dealings, reckless conduct, etc. as the Hearin
fficer concludes. (Findings, pg 17).

20
21
22

Idaho Code 54-2054(9) is limited to fees for the "performance of any act
equiring a real estate license. No one suggests that only a person with a real estat
icense can "market" real property. Access to a multiple listing service is not somethin

23

hat by statute requires a real estate license, Instead, it is a rule engineered by broker

24

o establish and maintain a monopoly on who gets to broadly advertise homes for sale.

25

etitioner's BricfSupporti.IJg Judicial Review - 5
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PAGE

ccess to a multiple listing service is limited to agents by the brokers who own th

2

ervice, not by the law of the State of Idaho that governs real estate agents.

I

etitioner wants to help citizens of the State of Idaho who do not want to pay what the

3

erceive are exorbitant commissions by using his status as an agent to get them acces

4

o the multiple listing, then he is really doing nothing more than opening a marketin
oor to them that an exclusive club had previously kept closed. Think about it, there i

5

6
7

o salesmanship involved in entering data into a computer so that a home may b
arketed. It is no different than advertising in a newspaper or at the comer convenien
tore.

Sellers recognize that greater exposure leads to more interest, and a multipl

isting service obviously generally generates more notice of the sale than does a sign 0

8

he property.

Realtor fees are customarily not paid until and unless there is

9

ompletion of a sale (a closing), and then they are paid for the services that a realto

10

rovided in bringing a buyer and seller together. It is the art of negotiating and the wor
f follow through, with lenders, other agents, loan payoffs, etc, that makes up th

11

essence of what a realtor does and how he or she can justify a commission based fee.

12

imply posting notice that a property is for sale-again whether through a sign in th

13

ard, an advertisement in the paper, or a description in a multiple listing servi
equires no special skill or training and thus is not something that does or should requir

14

real estate license. To wrongly apply the law governing fees for acts that do, by la

15

equire a real estate license, to a marketing program that is designed to help Idah

16

itizens keep the cost of selling their homes as low as possible essentially denies
hoice to Idaho residents who are willing to accept greater responsibility for selling thei

17

18
19

As for the other conclusions regarding conduct not involving a flat fee marketin
rogram, Petitioner has had counsel prepare briefs (Brief in Support of Motion fo

20
21
22

aking Exception to Recommended Order--Item 14 on the Index of Agency Record, an
emorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration-Item 8 on the Index of Agenc
ecord) that were carefully prepared and presented an alternate picture of a parsa
ho substantially complied with Idaho Real Estate Law while at the same time tried t

23

aintain a business following the death of its broker and earnestly worked with the bot

24

he Idaho Real Estate Commission and the national headquarters of Help-U-Sell t

25

etitioner's Brief Supporting Judicial Review - 6
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acilitate a transfer of ownership of a franchise for a very short period of time (Octobe
1, 2007 to December 5, 2007~just over a month). During that time there were t\N
isting for two properties for one person, Aaron Krivor, in which a listing agreement wa

3

xecuted not by Petitioner at the end of October 2007 and then activated in earl

4

ecember. There simply is no evidence that Petitioner took any action with regard t
his one customer between October 31 2007, the end of his association with Georg
j

5

ucera and December 5, 2009, when his association with Treaty Rock began.

Give

6

hese facts, which were startlingly ignored by the Hearing Officer and the Commission i

7

s Final Order. Most significant is the fact that Petitioner's signature does not appea
n either the listing agreements for Aaron Krivor.

8

Like in a witch hunt, facts that do not support a pre~conceived conclusion ar

9
10

imply ignored. Another example of this is the findings and conclusions reached wit
egard to the Treaty Rock Realty Listings Advertised on the Help-U-8ell Website.

11

reaty Rock's broker, Kirby Swanson, only became alarmed about any so called eros

12

arketing after Don Morse-the Commission's investigator told her that he believed th

13

ascription of Treaty Rock listings on the Help-U-Sell website were improper. (Kirb
wanson Deposition pg. 17-part of Item 0 in the Index of Agency Record).

14

15
16

H

asically threatened Ms. Swanson into taking action that she might not otherwise hav
aken.

The Help-U-Sell website was for Petitioner's Washington franchise and th

escriptions are not misleading in that Treaty Rock is used for the Idaho listings. Bot
istings just happen to be on a website that Petitioner used for both Washington an

17
18

19

daho. Respondent acknowledges, in its brief titled "Petitioner's Support of the Finding
f Fact and Conclusions of law" on page 4 (Item 11 on the Index of Agency Record

hat the concept of cross marketing properties may be utilized, but supports this with
tatement that has no legal backing "this occurs only where the brokerages are license

20

n Idaho..... Here you have a situation where one brokerage was properly identified a

21

eing licensed in Washington (Help-U-Sell) and one in Idaho (Treaty Rock)

22

ssentially, this kind of advertising is to let people know that a person has two differen
ssociations and listings, one in Washington and one in Idaho.

23

It is not anymor

isleading to the public, than cross marketing is in general. Certainly, alone, it does no

24

ive rise to a revocation of a real estate license. In fact none of this does.

25
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CONCLUSION

2
3

The Hearing Officer takes a few isolated facts to support her Conclusions an

4

ankly ignores verifiable facts that lead to a different conclusion. At a minimum, thi

5

ase should be remanded with instructions for the Hearing Officer and the Commissio
o address the facts and law supporting Petitioner. By address, Petitioner means stat

6

hy they are or are not important in arriving at the conclusions drawn. The impartia

7

bserver would very much wonder why John Runkle would complain about an act tha

8

e gave tacit endorsement of by signing his name to the listing Agreements. Th
mpartial observer (Idaho citizen) would wonder why he or she cannot pay a flat fee to

9

ealtor to help market the sale of his or her property, without being required to accep

10

he full menu of agent services. An Idaho citizen should have the right to participate a
uch or as little as he or she wants in the sale of his or her home.

11

09/09

With flat fe

arketing, a home seller gets exposure to the market, but still retains the authority an

12

bility to handle the negotiation of the sale of his or her own home. Idaho real estat

13

aw requiring an agent to be paid through his or her broker is limited to compensatio
amed for services that require a real estate agent license. Advertising a home for sal

14

]5
16

oes not require a real estate license. If this position is accepted by this Court. then th
issionary zeal of the Commission in its effort to string together innuendo and non
elated, non~reoccurring facts about the character and behavior of Petitioner

t

'cleanse" Idaho real estate of a so called "bad" seed reveals itself for the false front tha
17
18

t9

t truly is.

The Commission has undertaken a mountainous effort just to be "right

neluding the almost unfathomable amount of attorney fees and costs it has tolerated.
'Much to do about nothing" is a very appropriate and fitting ending. Please break t
pell that has kept everyone unfairly and irrationally focused on persecuting Petitioner

20

Respectfully submitted this
21

..a day of November 2009.

22
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MICHAEL
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PETITIONER
3304 N. Park Road
Spokane Valley, WA 99212
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Kirtlan G. Naylor
[ISB 1\0. 3569J
NA YLOR & HALES. P.c.
Attorneys at La\\
95() \V. Bannock Street. Ste. 610
BOise. ID 83702
Telephone No. (208) 383-9511
Facsimile No. (208) 383-9516
Attorneys for Respondent

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
MICHAEL SCOTT l\lACLA Y.
Case No. CV -OC-2009-07296
Petitioner,

RESPONDENT'S MOTION
TO DISMISS

vs.

IDAHO STATE REAL ESTATE
COMMISSION.
Respondent.

Respondent Idaho Real Estate Commission. by and through its attorneys (If recorJ.
Naylor & Hales. P.c.. moves this Court. pursuant to I.R.C.P. 8 ..+(n) and

(0).

for its order striking

Petitioner's Brief in Support of Petition for Judicial Review and dismissing this matter.
This Court, in its Order Governing Judicial Review tiled April 28. 2009. ordered that
"The Petitioner's brief shall be filed and served within 35 days of the date the transcript and record
are filed with the Court." The Notice of Lodging of Agency Record-Proceedings Not Transcribed
\vas tiled with the Court on May 7. 2009. and the Notice of Lodging ofTranseript \\as tiled with the

RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS - 1.

00025

Cnun un October 7.2009. Therefore. pursuant to the Court's order. and using the latest tiling date

of tbe lodging of documents. 35 days ti'om October 7. 2009. \vould he Nowmber 12. 2009.!
Given the fact that Petitioner's Brief in Suppurt of Petition for Judicial Revie\\ \\as
filed on November 13.2009. the brief is untimely and must he stricken and the case dismissed. The
Court's order is mandatory. and relies on the filing date \\ith the Court. not sen ice date to the parties.
Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 84(n). the failure ofa pany to timely take any steps in the process
forjudicial review. while not deemedjurisdictional. may be grounds for appropriate sanctions. \\hich
may include dismissal of a petition for judicial review.
No request for additional time was received prior to the deadline. and \\hile Petitioner
is acting as pro se counsel. pro se litigants are held to all standards of attorneys. King \' .It iyeh. l)l4
I·.2d 565.567 (9 th Cir. 1(87) (pro se litigants are hcld to the same procedural rules as counseled
litigants).
Therefore. it is respectfully submitted that Petitioner's case hefore this Court on
administrati\l~

review by the District COLIrt be dismissed. No oral argumcnt is requested.
Respectfully submitted this

~-"-.-

day of Nowmber, 2009.

NA YLOR & HALES. P.c.

By -+-+_

'The 35th day was actually November 1 L 2009; hO\vevcr, pursuant to Rule 6. l.R.C.P ..
since that date was Veterans Day. a legal holiday. the deadline falls to the next court date.

RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS - 2.

lH)O~ti

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
served. by the method(s) indicated, a true and "",""'0.0T

~~-

of 0:o\ember. :2009. I caused to be

Michael S. Maclay
3304 N. Park Road
Spokane Valley, WA 99212
Petitioner

C.S. Mail
Hand Dcli\ered
Federal Express
Fax Transmission

Kimberly A. Coster
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Real Estate Commission
633 N. 4th Street
P.O. Box 83720
Boise. 10 83720-0077

c:.s. !Vlail
Hand Dcli\ered
E-!Vlai I: ~.=-,,--==-.;,,-~=~==,-,
Fax Transmission
334-2050
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOCRTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

MICHAEL SCOTT MACLAY,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-OC0907296

7

vs.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

8
9

IDAHO STATE REAL ESTATE
COMMISSION,

1

Defendant.

1

This case came before the COUl1 on Respondent Idaho Real Estate Commission's (the
12

Commission's) motions to dismiss and motion to stay.

The Court, having determined that no

13

hearing IS necessary, will deny the motion to dismiss and grant the motion to stay.
15

1.

16

The Commission asserts that this judicial review should be dismissed with prejudice because

17

the Petitioner's opening brief was filed one day late. The Commission relies on Rule 8..1-(n), I.R.C.P.

18

Motion to Dismiss

The Petitioner, Michael Scott MaClay (MaClay) objects to the motion, citing Alw v. Idaho

19

TransportatioJl Department, 145 Idaho 192, 177 P.3d 406 (Ct. App. 2(08).
The Court, having reviewed AllO and having reviewed the procedural hIstory of tillS case,
21

denies the motion to dismiss.

Under Rule 84(n), the Court may impose a sanction up to and

23

including dismissal with prejudice.

However, there is a preference for decision on the merIts:

24

dismissal is a drastic sanction for failure to comply with time limits. There is no prejudice shown

25

the Commission. Therefore, the motion to dismiss is denied.

6
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00028

to

')

Motion to Stav

1
2

Contemporaneous with the motion to dismiss, the Commission moved to stay the briefing

3

schedule. It appears that MaClay has not objected to that motion: therefore, it will be granted. The

4

Commission's brief shall be filed and served within twenty-eight (28) days of service of this order.

5

MaClay's reply brief, if any, shall be filed and served within twenty-one (21) days of service of the

6

Commission's brief. Either pmty may schedule the case for oral argument after all briefs are fileu.

7

If neither party calls the clerk to schedule argument within fourteen (14) days after the final brief is
8

filcu, the Court will deem oral argument waived and decide the case on the briefs anu the record.
9

10
11

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this

¢J(g'r~ day of January,

2010.

I)

3

14
15
16
17

18

19
2U

22
23

24
2S

26

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - PAGE 2

00029

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

1

2

L J. David NavalTo, the undersigned authority, do hereby cenify that I havc maikd, by
Unitcd States Mail, one copy of the MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER as notice
pursuant to Rule 77(d) I.R.C.P. to each of the attomeys of record in this cause in cnvelopes
addressed as follows:

4

6

KIRTLAN G. NA YLOR
NAYLOR & HALES. PC
950 W BANNOCK, STE 610
BOISE, ID 83701

7

8

MICHAEL S. MACLAY
330-l: N. PARK ROAD
SPOKANE Y ALLEY WASHINGTON 99111

9
~O

II

1

KIMBERL Y A. COSTER
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
IDAHO REAL ESTATE COMMISSION
POST OFFICE BOX 83720
BOISE IDAHO 83710-0077

13

14

IS
16
17
18

1. DA YID l\iA YARRO
Clerk of the District Court
Ada County, I<.laho

19

20

Date:

--"H'=+-Ll...i..----

23

24
25
6
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Kirtlan G. Naylor
[ISB No. 3569]
NAYLOR & HALES, P.c.
Attorneys at Lavv
950 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 610
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone No. (208) 383-9511
Facsimile No. (208) 383-9516
Attorneys for Respondent

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
MICHAEL SCOTT MACLAY,
Case No. CY-OC-2009-07296
Petitioner,
RESPONDENT IDAHO REAL ESTATE
COMMISSION'S REPLY BRIEF TO
PETITIONER'S PETITION FOR
JUDICIAL REVIE\V

vs.
IDAHO STATE REAL ESTATE
COMMISSION.
Respondent.

Respondent, Idaho Real Estate Commission, by and through its attorneys of record.
Naylor & Hales, P.c., files this brief in SUppOlt of the Final Order issued by the Idaho Real Estate
Commission ("Agency") on March 19,2009, wherein the Findings of Fact, Conclusions ofLm. and
Recommended Order ("Recommended Order") of the Hearing Ofticer was adopted.

Standard of Review
An agency's factual determination need only be based on substantial and compdcnt
evidence-evidence defined by the Idaho Supreme COUlt as "evidence that a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Delllbom v. Slale, Indus. Special lilt/em. Fund. 129

RESPONDENT'S REPLY BRIEF - 1.

oooa1

Idaho 579, 582 (1997). This standard is "more than a scintilla of prooC but less than a
preponderance." l\;faller a/Wilson, 128 Idaho 161, 164 (1996). "Substantial and competent evidence
need not be uncontradicted, nor does it need to necessarily lead to a certain conclusion." Cowan v.

Bd.

0/ Comm'rs,

143 Idaho 501, 517 (2006).

This standard holds true even though there is

contlicting evidence in the record. SOlO v. Simp/Of, 126 Idaho, 536, 539 (1994).
Idaho Code Section 67-5279 sets forth the statutory scope of revie\v for the court in
reviewing an agency's decision:
67-5279. SCOPE OF REVIEW -- TYPE OF RELIEF. (1) The court
shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight
of the evidence on questions of fact.
(2) When the agency was not required by the provisions of
this chapter or by other provisions of law to base its action
exclusively on a record, the court shall affirm the agency action
unless the COUl1 finds that the action was:
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency:
(c) made upon unlawtlll procedure; or
(d) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.
If the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or
in par1, and remanded for further proceedings as necessary.
(3) When the agency was required by the provisions of this
chapter or by other provisions oflavv to issue an order, the court shall
affirm the agency action unless the court finds that the agency's
findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency:
(c) made upon unlaw1lll procedure:
(d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whok:: or
(e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.
If the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or
in part, and remanded for further proceedings as necessary.
(4) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (2) and (3)
of this section, agency action shall be affirmed unless substantial
rights of the appellant have been prejudiced.
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Analysis

In the case before this Court on judicial review, the Court has the advantage of
numerous pleadings and brieilngs occurring prior to and following the appointed rh:aring Officer's
Recommended Order, and the Final Order of the Agency.
In fact, Petitioner's Support for the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Ckrk
Record 0011), and Petitioner's Objection to Respondent's Motion for Taking Exception to
Recommended Order filed January 22, 2009 (Clerk's Record 0025), sets forth signiticant responses
to the arguments raised by Mr. Maclay both in the Agency proceeding below as well as in the District
Court Petition for Review. The documents and the arguments set forth in the record below ckarl;
support the standard for judicial review that the eonclusions by the Hearing Otlicer and the Idaho
Real Estate Commission are supported by the evidence such that a reasonable mind could accept and
support those eonclusions.
Before addressing any specific objections raised in the Petition for Judicial Re\ k~\\.
it is important to note up front what is absent from the Petition for Judicial Review. Petitioner has
not raised any allegation that the agency aetion was in violation of constitutional or statutory
provisions; in excess of the statutory authority of the Agency; made upon unlawful procedure: or
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion as required by Idaho Code Section 67-5'279. Further.
Petitioner has failed to raise any reasonable argument that the Agency action prejudiced the
substantial rights ofthe appellant. Id. Therefore, the Petition for Judicial Review before this Court
must be dismissed, and the Agency's Final Order must be affirmed.
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Petitioner's Substantive Argument l
Much of Petitioner's Brief asserts that the Hearing OHicer failed to give any weight
to Petitioner's evidence; however, the Hearing Officer is not required to identify and address c\ ery
piece of evidence and every testimony raised by the licensee, and declare that evidence not credible.
Rather, the statutory standard for review on a petition for judicial revie'w is to determine \\hether
there is substantial and competent evidence to support the findings of fact and conclusions of law.
This standard holds true even though there is contlicting evidence in the record.

5;010

v. Simp/of, J 26

Idaho 536, 539 (1994).
There \vas sufficient evidence in the record by John Runkle in his deposition
testimony where he admitted that certain documents may have been signed by his authorized agent
with listing agreements referencing flat fees involving Mr. Maclay, but Mr. Runkle explained that
no nat fee was ever paid through the brokerage to Mr. Maclay pursuant to those agreements.
Therefore, even ifMr. Maclay had erroneously believed Mr. Runkle authorized him to engage in t1at
ke agreements, the brokerage never was asked to, nor in fact did, pay Mr. :vlaclay any 11at fee
payment through the brokerage. (Runkle Depo., pp. 25-29.) Mr. Runkle testified in his deposition
that he, or his agent, Mr. Ayles, may have not comprehended the signi1icance of the seller
representation agreements entered into by Mr. Maclay involving the 11 at kc arrangement.
Nonetheless, the Hearing Otlicer properly found sufficient evidence to find the existence of the nat
fee marketing program without paying money through the brokerage, and which failed to maintain

Respondent sees no purpose in responding to Petitioner's diatribe of an alleged "witch hunt"
and the historical review of the Salem witch trials. Mr. Maclay was atTorded every due process
afforded by the applicable rules and statutes governing the underlying proceeding, and exercised
those rights by attending the administrative hearing, and filing numerous \vTitten objections and
pleadings subsequent to the hearing related to the substantive issues raised by the hearing.
I
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the required documentation for the brokerage by his various listings.

The Hearing Officer!s

Recommended Order (pp. 4-9) recognized that Mr. Runkle and/or Mr. Ayles signed the seller
representation agreements, and had sufIicient evidence from Mr. Runkle's explanation as to why the
practice was still not authorized by the brokerage. There was no question that tailing to have these
marketing fees paid through the brokerage was a violation of license law.
Petitioner next argues that the t1at fee marketing fees are not required to be paid
through the real estate broker. While it is true that simply advertising properties for sale, such as in
a newspaper or on a for sale by owner website, are services not requiring a real estate liccnse, iv1r.
Maclay's conduct as testified to by himself was not limited to simply advertising propaties. He
accepted a fee for the performance of acts requiring a real estate license, including taking telephone
calls in response to "for sale" signs, negotiating sales, providing comparative market analyses. taking
pictures of the listing, placing yard signs, placing the listings on the multiple listing service (which
requires a real estate license), and responding to contacts by interested buyers. (Maclay Depo., pp.
35-37.) These acts all require a real estate license, and so any fees received in the performance of
these acts must be paid through the broker. There \vas sufficient evidence for the Hearing Officer
to make her Recommended Order, and upon which the Agency to adopt.
Mr. Maclay argues that the Multiple Listings Service is nothing more than "an
exclusive club" for the marketing of real estate, vvhich he did not believe should be kept closed.
However, a requirement by the Multiple Listings Service is that partici pants be licensees in the stak
of Idaho. Nonetheless, there was ample evidence to establish that Mr. Maclay did much more than
simply list these properties.
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Further, the only evidence in the record dealing with Eric Mower. from Help-U-SdL
is Exhibits E and F to the hearing, and neither deal with Mr. Maclay's attempt to transfer the Hdp-USell franchise trom the deceased George Kucera to Mr. Maclay. However. there was clear evidence
from Janet Ladd's hearing testimony (transcript, pp. 161-176), the Help-U-Sell

representati\l~.

indicating that she had communicated to Mr. Maclay \vhat was required for the transfer of a franchise
following Mr. Kucera's death. At no time did she make the representation to Mr. Maclay that any
transfer of the franchise had occurred and, in fact, he was served with letters to cease and desist from
using the Help-U-Sell franchise information.
Mr. Maclay continued to list Idaho properties on the Help-U-Sell website long atter
Mr. Kucera's death in October, and even after December 5, 2007, when he \vas under the Treaty
Rock Realty brokerage. The Krivor listing agreements were entered into on October 29,2007. at a
time when Mr. Maclay was not under a proper Idaho broker. Mr. Kucera died in early October 2007.
and neither Robbie Canfield nor Kirbi Swanson were his broker for the period of time October 29,
2007 through December 29,2007, when Kirbi Swanson was the broker for Treaty Rock Realty it)r
Mr. Maclay. Therefore, he acted without an Idaho licensed broker.

Conclusion
The Hearing Officer, and the Idaho Real Estate Commission ("Agency"), had
sufticient substantial and competent evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion as to all claims and as to all Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law adopted
in the Recommended Order. The Petition for Judicial Review must be denied and the Final Order
of the Agency must be affirmed.

RESPONDENT'S REPLY BRIEF - 6.

Respectfully submitted thi

day of February, 2010.
NAYLOR & HALES, P.e.

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _ _ day of February, :::W 10, I caused to be served.
by the methodes) indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon:
Michael S. Maclay
3304 N. Park Road
Spokane Valley, WA 99212
Pelitioner

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Federal Express
Fax Transmission

Kimberly A. Coster
Idaho Real Estate Commission
633 N. 4th Street
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0077
Attorney for Commission/Agency

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
E-Mail: kim.coster((rirec.idaho.~ll\
Fax Transmission
334-2050
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5

6

7

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 4th JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

8
9

Michael Scott Maclay,
Case No. CVOC0907296

10

11

Petitioner
vs.

PETITIONER'S REPLY TO
RESPONDENT'S RESPONSE BRIEF

Idaho Real Estate Commission,

12

Res ondent

13

14

Petitioner, MICHAEL SCOTT MACLAY, submits this reply to Respondent's Repl
nef. Petitioner also, respectfully, requests a hearing in this matter.

15
16

17

Respondent begins Its Reply Brief by minimizing the standard of review and i
he process accentuates the lack of substantial facts to support the Final Order.
Ithough a "preponderance of the evidence" may not be required, without its sensibl

IX

uidance, how can any fact be properly distinguished from opinion? "Evidence that

19

easonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion" is the same kind

20

0

tandard that Joseph McCarthy used in the 1950's ... full of vague considerations an
ipe for preconceived opinions to construct into prevailing facts.

21
22
23
24

25

Petitioners intention in this pleading is to present the core key points to conside
n evaluating this case that are clearly lacking in serving as a basis for revocation of hi
icense. And, as Petitioner's livelihood and reputation are at stake, and he has bee
ummeled by the Respondent in its effort to prevail, including; publishing th
'cLilloner Rcply to Rcsponse Brief - 1

26
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ommission's decision in the Agency's newspaper without any mention of an appeal
while expending an incomprehensible amount of time and energy and money on wha

2

s clearly a lack of procedures and policies as it relates to this case) is also wrong.

3
4

Simple, substantial evidence exists in this record to completely suppo
etitioner. Taking away a license to sell real estate in Idaho is clearly unwarranted an

5

etaliatory for having the pure audacity to stand for what is clearly right, and minus an

6

olicyor procedure from the commission to the contrary, and, hopefully, resulting in th

7

est interests of the consumer and the entire community.

At a minimum, this cas

hould be remanded and the Hearings Officer ordered to give specific reasons as t
8
9

)0

hy the facts supporting Petitioner and his contention that flat fee marketing is legal ar
ot, in and of themselves, "evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequat
o support a conclusion the Petitioner was simply and openly navigating, with hi
raker's knowledge and consent, through a very gray area of real estate law.

11
12
13

Th

earing Officer adopted Respondent's opinion that there was a pattern of misconduc
arranting the severest sanction in license revocation without ever addressing a singl
ctual fact supporting a contrary conclusion - none. This outcome is patently unfair an
nderscores partiality.

14

15
16

There is not just conflicting evidence in the record. Instead, there is a complete,
rbitrary, and utter disregard for important facts that show that the responsible broker
ohn Runkle, knew and tacitly approved of Petitioners flat fee marketing program

17
18
19

unkle or his agent signed all of the listing agreements and the letter from Petitioner'
ashington broker (a part of Respondent's exhibits) that credibly supports Petitioner'
ontention that the very basis of his relationship with Runkle and my mission to brin
his marketing program to Idaho. Additionally, in a clear abuse of discretion, th

20
21
22

dministrative Hearing Officer failed to give any weight to the evidence, such as th
arch 1, 2006, letter from attorney and real estate broker, George Kucera, stating tha
lat fee marketing was not an act or service that required a real estate license or that th
ees must go through a broker's account. Respondent's own investigator acknowledge

23

hat this was a gray area-yet Petitioner is supposed to have his licensed revoked.

24

etitioner performed other services as a real estate agent, for which he was required t

25
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e licensed (with any commission to paid through the broker for any act requiring

1

icense without any violation or complaint), but it was clearly understood that the flat fe,

2

as solely for marketing the property through the media such as on a website,

I
I

3

4

The whole scenario smells of arbitrariness and capriciousness.

Petitioner ha

een open and forthright about this practice from the very beginning and has, in fact,
5

ontlnued to do so for nearly seventeen years.

Instead of working with Petitioner t

6

evelop more clear policies and procedures, Respondent overwhelmed Petitioner wit

7

uestionable means and pre-ordained conclusions, just like McCarthy and his so calle
ighteous crusaders. From the length of the investigation, to the time and money spen

8

n investigators and attorneys, to the heavy handed way in which the investigator deal

9

ith Kirby Swanson to the solicitation of complaints against Respondent, to the surrea

10

nfair atmosphere of the Hearing where members of the Idaho Real Estate Commissio
olemnly observed and participated like regal ultimate authorities posing as working i

11

12

he public's best interests-how could Petitioner possibly have stood a fair chance.
emember, the Commission is composed of realtors who have a vested profit interes
n controlling access to the multiple listing service,

L4

15
16

A recap of the most salient and significant facts supporting Petitioner and hi
ssertion that substantial evidence exists to show the Hearing Officer's decision wa
rbitrary and capricious are as follows:

17

That it is understood that both John Runkle & Steve Ayles (ReaITeam) and Jerr

18

ebb (Family First Real Estate Group) were working through Petitioner toward

19

inalizing a merger of both companies while offering agents "flat affiliation fees"

20

RealTeam) with the freedom to accept "flat marketing fees" (Family First Real Estat
roup). In fact, both offices had crossed-licensed agents in both states through thei

21

espective companies and for this exact purpose. It was only after Runkle and Web

22

erminated their negotiations that Petitioner joined Kucera and HelpUSeli and for th

23

urpose of carrying on the business, and offering this business model, followin

24

ucera's terminal illness in both Idaho and Washington and expected death. Bot
unkle and Webb had a viable motive in partiCipating in this "solicited" complaint fo

25
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heir own economic benefit resulting in the removal of a viable competitor with prove
esults superior to their own. This is the continuing basis of Petitioner's successful, third
2

eneration business, which is perfectly legal in every state including; Idaho.

3
4
5

The Commission continues to "paint" Petitioner as some rogue agent acting as
roker without oversight. Runkle never issued any directive, nor has the Commissio
roduced, or presented, any evidence Petitioner was ever instructed to do anythin

6

ontrary to what Petitioner was doing. There is no Policy or Procedure in the RealTea

7

peration Manual to the contrary (as would be required by the Commission Policy an

8

rocedures Manual). Therefore, Runkle, as the responsible broker, is the only one wh

9

iolated the Commission's requirements. Petitioner's compliance as a

~salesperson"

auld not be optional to such a directive and it was simply never issued as it neve
10

11
12

HelpUSell was, in fact, processing Petitioner's application for Kucera's franchis

13

s planed prior to Kucera's death (evidenced by letters from HeJpUSel1 as contained i

14

espondent's exhibits). HelpUSeH never demanded the State of Idaho or Washington t
o anything to the contrary, and, in fact, recognized Petitioner as the Interim Broker an

15

ater as the Responsible Broker in Washington without any objection. The fact tha

l6

ome an unknowing and unauthorized secretary responded to a "solicited" request b

17

he Commission is suspect and probably inadmissible under the circumstances whil

18

elpUSel! was in Chapter 7 and not able to process Petitioner's application. The fac
etitioner was advertising Idaho listings (while w'lth Treaty Rock in Idaho) on hi

19

ashington HelpUSeli website along with his Washington listings, and with the prope

20

'disclosures" for each and every listing related to the respective state of ongln, i

21

erfectly acceptable and proper--there remains nothing in the Commission's Policy an

22

rocedures Manual to the contrary. It should be further noted that Petitioner did no
ave access to Kucera's HelpUSell website immediately following his death .. , and tha

23

he website was later granted to Petitioner when properly licensed.

24

25
26

27
28
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It is clear that the commission is targeting a business model which is no
1

orbldden in their policy and procedures manual written in the mid 1940's. Th
2

ommission chose not to respond to Kucera or Runkle's inquiries. This activity is lega

3

n Washington and each and every state neighboring state to Idaho, and in Idaho, s

4

hy not for Petitioner? The other "solicited" complaints do not rise to the threshold

5

evocation of license and are

~a

0

lot to do about nothing." Any minor errors or omission

s contained in the complaint are the responsibility of the responsible broker, Runkle,
6
7

9

nd he alone is responsible for the Petitioner, the salesperson as outlined in th
ommission's Policy and Procedures Manual.

Petitioner has not endangered the public, committed any immoral act, converte
unds or even worked outside of the instruction of the responsible broker. Both, Kucer

10

nd Runkle, as the responsible brokers, made every reasonable attempt to satisfy th

11

ommission's opinion of their own Rules and Procedures (or lack thereof), in advance,

12

nd without any formal response from the Commission there is simply nothing in thei

13

ules and Procedures Manual to consider (and it is inconceivable that th

14

ommission's investigator, Mr. Morse, who only three months in the position as thei
nvestigator, would state that he would have answered the question if asked and ha

15

he authority to do so - and based on what non-existent policy or procedure?) Wh

16

ouldn't Petitioner rely on the seasoned experience of George Kucera, a licensed rea

17

state attorney and broker also licensed in virtually each and every western state.

18

inus any other solution from the Commission, why wouldn't Petitioner rely on th
olicies and procedures of other Commissions of neighboring states to Idaho (wher

19

etitioner has also participated in establishing clear poliCies and procedures consisten

20

o Petitioner's activities here in Idaho), specifically; in Washington where Petitioner ha

21

een successfully operating offering flat marketing fees for nearly 17 years as a thir

22

eneration real estate broker? There is no evidence from the Respondent that ther
as any complaint, solicited or otherwise, that any fee or commission related to any ac

23

equiring a real estate license for any closed sale for which Petitioner participated. Th

24

act remains that fees for marketing are not subject to Commission oversight, and th

25
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act that Petitioner was licensed should be considered a benefit, not a determent. Unde
espondent's reasoning, newspapers and real estate magazines and all othe

2

arketing companies of every nature, and their respective websites, should have

3

esponsible broker, and require that everyone associated with their marketing compan

4

e licensed. The Commission, therefore, had no justification for terminating Petitioner'

5

usiness license for continuing to offer home marketing, and the end result is that th
ommission is fixing "commissions" while "interfering with free trade" in attempting t

6

ontrol consumer options.

7

CONCLUSION

8
')

The Hearing Officer and the Idaho Real Estate Commission had insufficien
pinions that completely ignored evidence that a reasonable mind might accept a

10

dequate to support a conclusion that Petitioner was not intentionally engaging in an

11

ct that was improper, and certainly no act that warrants a revocation of Petitioner's rea

12

state license. If, not for the flat fee marketing program.. we simply would not be her

13

nd the light of objectivity clearly demonstrates that the Petitioner's actions do no

14

arrant the recommended order handed down by a not so really independent hearin
fficer ... which then became a final edict issued by Respondent. The McCarthy er

15

hould not be revisited in this case and the record should be made straight in restorin

16

etitioner's integrity, reputation and good business ethics that clearly benefit th

17

onsumer and the entire community.

]8
19

Respectfully submitted this £. day of March 2010.
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PETITIONER
3304 N. Park Road
Spokane Valley, WA 99212
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1

2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

.,"
4

5
6
7
8

9

hereby certify that on the It? th day of March, 2010, I caused to be served, by fa
ransmission, a true and correct copy of the Petitioner's Reply to Respondent'
esponse Brief upon:
irtlan G. Naylor
aylor and Hales, PC.
50 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 610
oise, ID 83702
ax: 1-208-383-9516

10

11

ated this £ t h day of March 2010.
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MACLAY

1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

2

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
3
4
5

;'vllCHAEL SCOTT MACLAY,

6

Petitioner,

Case No. CV -OC0907296

7

vs.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

8

IDAHO REAL ESTATE COMMISSION,
9

lO

Res ondent.

II

This matter is before the Court on appeal from the Idaho Real Estate Commission's
12

(Commission's) finding that Petitioner Michael Scott Maclay (Maclay) violated various provisions
13
14

of Idaho Code Title 54, Chapter 20 and from its decision to revoke Maclay's Idaho real estate

15

license and require Maclay to pay a civil fine of $5,000.00. Maclay argues that the facts do not

16

support any finding of misconduct, dishonesty, recklessness, or deceit and that his actions do not

17

provide a basis for the revocation of his real estate license. He asks the Court to revie\', the record

18

and remand the case to the Commission to address the facts and law he presented. For the reasons

19

set forth below, the Court affirms the Commission's decision.
20
21
:22

FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

23

Maclay began working as a licensed real estate sales agent in Idaho in 2000. He associated

24

with eight brokers between 2000 and 2005, and then on March 10,2006, he became licensed with a

25

broker named John Runkle (Runkle) at RealTeam Real Estate Center, Inc. (RealTeam).

l\IEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - PAGE 1

000(15

Just two days before Maclay began working with RealTeam, Mark Wanner and Juanita
1

2

Sanchez signed an exclusive seller representation agreement on which Maclay designated himself as

3

the agent. The agreement does not contain a beginning or expiration date for the term of the

4

agreement. Brokerage fees are provided for, but no additional fees such as a flat listing fee arc

5

included. I Maclay did not sign the agreement, and neither did any other agent or broker.

6

After Maclay began working for RealTeam, Maclay an'anged for Idaho property owners to

7

pay an upfront marketing fee to either Maclay or RealTeam for property to be listed on the Multiple
8

Listing Service (MLS). Maclay accepted "flat fees from sellers who wanted flat fee access into the
9

10
1

MLS as a marketing fee, only." However, these flat fees were generally noted on exclusive seller
representation agreements as an additional fee to the brokerage fee. If a seller paid a flat fee of $295.
Maday would visit the property, do a comparative market analysis, discuss pricing, discuss the

13
14

option of having ads run in the newspaper and Craig's List, list the property on MLS, and place a
RealTeam sign in the yard with Maclay's phone number on it. If the seller procured a purchaser, the

15

seller would not pay the brokerage fee of 3%, but if Maclay procured a purchaser, the seller would
16

pay the brokerage fee. Accordingly, if a potential buyer called the phone number on the sign that
17

18

Maday placed in the yard, Maclay would show the home and attempt to sell the property.

19

Ken and Carolyn Jackson signed an exclusive seller representation agreement on March 2-4,

20

2006 and paid the flat fee noted on the agreement to either Maclay or RealTeam. There is no price

21

filled in on the Jacksons' agreement. Nevertheless, Maclay placed a RealTeam sign in the yard,
listed the Jacksons' property on MLS, and looked for a buyer.

23
24

25
26

I During Maday's deposition, he testified that he did not remember this agreement and that he did not remember
whether Wanner paid a flat fee. There is no evidence in the record indicating that Wanner did in fact pay a nat fee.

IVIEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - PAGE 2

1

Russ Rhuman signed an exclusive seller representation agreement on June 1, 2006 and paid

2

Maclay, not RealTeam, the $295 MLS flat fee noted on the agreement. Maclay placed a RealTeam

3

sign in the yard and listed Rhuman's property on MLS.

4

Richard and Connie Matthiesen signed an exclusive seller representation agreement on July

5

25, 2006 which provided that a $295 flat listing fee was to be paid to Maclay. Although Maclay

6

does not remember receiving a payment from the Matthiesens, Maclay testified that it would have

7

been consistent with his practice for the Matthiesens to pay him directly.
8

Steve and Kerri Smith signed an exclusive seller representation agreement on September 26,
9

10

2006 and later paid a $499 upfront marketing fee to Hotline Properties on October 13, 2006.

11

Neither Maclay nor his broker signed the agreement. The agreement does not list a designated agent

l2

and does not contain beginning and expiration dates for the term of the agreement. Nevertheless,

13

the Smith's property was listed on MLS through RealTeam, and Maclay was designated as the

l4

listing a member. Maclay acknowledges that at some point he became responsible for the Smith's

15

MLS listing but he denies listing the property or being compensated for the representation. He
16

claims that the paperwork for the Smiths' property was prepared by JelTy Webb (Webb) as a result
17
l8

of Webb's affiliation with Hotline Properties and not because of any request by Maclay.

19

During 2006, Runkle had a couple of conversations with Maclay regarding Maclay's

20

marketing strategy of charging an upfrom fee for listing property in MLS. Runkle told Maclay that

2l

he would only approve the use of an upfrom fee for limited services if the sellers signed an

22

addendum acknowledging that they were receiving limited services for the upfront fcc. According

23

to Runkle, he also told Maclay that before Maclay collected and kept upfrom fees, he needed to get
24

a letter from the Commission saying that this type of acti vity is legal because Runkle did not believe
25
26

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - PAGE 3
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1

2

that taking money without running it through the brokerage was permissible. Runkle did sign off on
some of the agreements.

3

Following these conversations, Runkle received a phone call from a man named Aaron

4

Klennert who stated that he paid an upfront marketing fee directly to Maclay. Runkle responded to

5

this news by terminating Maclay's employment on October 30, 2006. 2

After this termination,

6

Runkle received another phone call from a different person claiming that he paid an upfront
7

marketing fee directly to Maclay.

Runkle subsequently filed a formal complaint with the

8

Commission alleging that Maclay failed to turn in funds the broker, took payments directly from
9

o

clients, misrepresented the brokerage, and purposefully failed to turn in files to the brokerage.

11

In January 2007, Maclay became licensed under a broker named George Kucera at Hclp-V-

12

Sell List 4 Less Realty (Help-V-Sell) in Idaho. Kucera was a licensed broker in both Washington

13

and Idaho, and he owned a Help-V-Sell franchise that was licensed in both Washington and Idaho.

4

Apparently at some point Kucera wrote a letter approving a nat fee aITangement.

15

On October 8,2007, Kucera passed away. A qualified broker was not appointed to calTY on
16

the Help-V-Sale franchise business in Idaho, so the Idaho license for Kucera's Help-V-Sell was
17

18

terminated on October 31,2007. As a result, Maclay lost his sales agent license with Help-U-Sell in

19

Idaho.

20

appointed an interim broker for the Help-V-Sell in Washington. Maclay staI1ed working tmvards

21

obtaining a broker's license in Idaho, but as of the hearing before the Commission on November 5,

22

However, Maclay claims that Kucera left the franchise to him and that Maclay was

2008, Maclay had not yet obtained a broker's license.

23
24
25

According (0 Maclay, he and Runkle talked about flat fees before Maclay even joined RealTeam. (Maclay Dep. 19::?Maclay contends that Runkle terminated Maclay's employment after Runkle changed his mind about lelling him
offer discounted listing programs with upfront marketing fees.
2

of.)

26
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On October 29, 2007, Alann Krivor (KJivor) signed two exclusive seller representation

1

2

agreements, one for each of two properties located in Idaho. The agreements listed a brokerage fee

3

but no additional fees. John Dohm (Dohm), an agent working with Maclay, designated himself and

4

Maclay as the agents and initialed that the term of the agreement commenced on November 26,

5

2007.

6

On November 28, 2007, Ktivor's properties were activated on MLS though Dohm and

7

Maclay were not licensed under a broker and a broker had not yet accepted the agreement. In the
8

MLS, Scott Maclay was named as the listing agent, and Treaty Rock Realty, Inc. (Treaty Rock) was
9

10

named as the listing brokerage though the data sheets for these properties each list Help-U-Sell as

11

the listing brokerage. Maclay is named as the listing agent in MLS, but he denies listing these

12

properties. Maclay also denies having knowledge that any paperwork had been completed with

13

respect to these properties until he later became licensed with Treaty Rock Reality, Inc.

14

On December 5, 2007, Maclay became licensed under broker Kirbi Swanson (Swanson)

15

with Treaty Rock.

While Maclay was affiliated with Treaty Rock, Maclay only aJTanged one

16

upfront marketing fee that Swanson was aware of, and this fee was paid to the brokerage. Yet even
17

18

if Maclay only alTanged for one upfront marketing fees, Maclay nevertheless adveI1ised Idaho

19

propel1ies listed with Treaty Rock, including the Krivor propel1ies, on Kucera's Help-L'-Scll

20

website. He noted a general affiliation between Treaty Rock and Help-U-Sell on the website though

21

there was no affiliation between the two companies recognized by the Commission, and he used the

22

Treaty Rock logo on the website.

23

DUling December 2007, Swanson asked Maclay to take the Treaty Rock logo and listings off
24

the Help-U-Sell website, but as of January 11, 2008, the logo, the Krivor propelties, and other Idaho
25

properties were still on that website. Some of the Idaho properties were listed for sale by owner as

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - PAGE 5

1

2

FSBO, but some were not.

Treaty Rock subsequently terminated Maclay's license on January 31,

2008, and Maclay remained on inactive status until the Commission reviewed his case.

3

In August 2008, the Staff of the Idaho Real Estate Commission filed a complaint against

4

Maclay with the Commission. On November 5, 2008, the Commission and the designated hearing

5
6

officer held a heating with respect to the complaint. On November 21, 2008, the hearing officer
issued her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order; and on March 19,2009,

7

the Commission adopted the recommended findings that Maclay violated Idaho Code

** 54-

8

2040(5); 54-2050(1)(a), (c); 54-2053(2), (4); 54-2054(9); 54-2060(2), (3), (11), (12); and 54-2065
9

10
11
12

and 54-2002. The Commission then revoked Maclay's real estate license and ordered Maclay to pay
a civil fine of $5,000.
Maclay subsequently filed a timely petition for judicial review.

13
14

ISSUE ON APPEAL

15

Whether the Commission's decision is supported by substantial evidence.
16
17
18

STANDARD OF REVIEW

19

In reviewing an agency's decision, an appellate court may not "substitute its judgment for

20

that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact." Idaho Code § 67-5279(1).

21

Instead, the court must defer "to the agency's findings of fact unless they are clearly enoneous."

2

Price v. PayetTe COUlllY Bd. of County Comm'rs, 131 Idaho 426, 429, 958 P.2d 583, 586 (1998);

23

Bennett v. State, 147 Idaho 141,142,206 P.3d 505,506 (Ct. App. 2009).
24

Agency action must be affirmed on appeal unless the court determines that the agency's
25

26

findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: (a) in violation of constitutional or statutory
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1

provisions: (b) in excess of statutory authority of the agency; (c) made upon unlawful procedure: (d)

2

not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or (e) arbitrary, capricious. or an

3

abuse of discretion. Idaho Code § 67-5279(3); Bennett, 147 Idaho at 142, 206 P.3d at 506. The

4

party attacking the agency's decision bears the burden of demonstrating that the agency cITed in a

5

manner specified in section 67-6279(3) and that a substantial right has been prejudiced. Price, 131

6

Idaho at 429, 958 P.2d at 586; Bennett, 147 Idaho at 142, 206 P.3d at 506.

7

Agencies are given the authority to make their own determinations of credibility and "to
8

place greater or less weight on any particular piece of evidence according to its relative credibility."
9

lO

Morgan v. Idaho Dep't of Health & Welfare, 120 Idaho 6,8,813 P.2d 345, 347 (1991); see a/so

II

Cooper v. Bd. of Profl Discipline, 134 Idaho 449, 457, 4 P.3d 561, 569 (2000). An appellate court

l2

may not "scrutinize the weight and credibility of the evidence relied upon," and it may not "overturn

l3

factual findings supported by substantial and competent evidence" even if there is conflicting

l4

evidence. SOlO v. Simplot, 126 Idaho 536, 539, 887 P.2d lO43, 1046 (1994) (citations omitted).

15
16

ANALYSIS
17

Maclay essentially asks this Court to review the record, weigh the evidence, and make its

l8
19

own findings of fact. He contends that if the Court reviews all the evidence in the record, the Court

20

will find that Maclay acted "in good faith with a determined effort to abide by the rules." According

21

to

22

of the facts presented by Maclay.

~laclay,

the hearing officer failed to address any of Maclay's exhibits and failed to consider any

23

As noted above, the Court may not engage in the type of review Maclay requests. The Court
24

may not determine what weight should be assigned to the evidence, and it may not make any
25

26
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1

findings of fact with respect to the record.

Instead, the Court may only determine if the

Commission's decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.
3

In this case, the Commission found evidence in the record that Maclay failed to comply wIth

4

various provisions of Idaho Code Title 54, Chapter 20, and Maclay does not argue that the evidence

5

the hearing officer relied upon does not support such a finding. Instead, Maclay asks the Court to

6

find that the evidence he presented does not support such a finding. However, to the extent that
7

evidence in the record supports the Commission's findings, consideration of Maclay's evidence will
8

not wanant a reversal.
9

10

If the Court reviews the record to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support

11

a finding that a person did not comply with the law, the COUll will look for evidence of non-

12

compliance. The Court will not ovellurn the Commission's findings just because there is evidence

13

that a person attempted to comply with Idaho law or that the person complied \vith the law 9OC'{ of

14

the lime. A good faith attempt to comply is inelevant in determining whether there is evidence that

15

a person actually failed to comply with a law.
16

17
18

1. Idaho Code § 54-2040(5)

19

The hearing officer found that Maclay violated Idaho Code § 54-2040(5) by using Kucera's

20

broker's license after Kucera's death to canyon Kucera's Help-U-Sell brokerage. Maclay does not

21

deny that he was not a licensed broker in Idaho during the year following Kucera's death, and he

22

does not deny that he continued to use Kucera's Help-U-Sell after Kucera's death. Instead, Maclay

23

claims that he was properly using Help-U-Sell's website after Kucera's death because Kucera left
24

the business to Maclay and because the transfer of the Help-U-Sell franchise from Kucera to Maclay
25
26
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1
2

was in the works. Maclay further claims that he was appointed an interim broker in Washington and
was appropriately using the Help-U-Sell website in Washington.

3

A sales agent may not use "another person's broker's license, whether for compensation or

4

not. to establish or can)' on a business for which a broker's license is required [orJ to manage and

5

control the office." Idaho Code § 54-2040(5). If a designated broker for a licensed business dies, a

6

sales agent may not carryon the business. Idaho Code § 54-2057. Only a qualified individual may
7

canyon the business, and only a broker properly licensed in Idaho is qualified to be responsible for
8

the activities of a licensed business in Idaho. Idaho Code §§ 54-2016, 54-2057. If a qualified
9

10
11

mdividual is not appointed within the time required by statute to CatTY on the business after a
broker's death, the business will cease to be licensed. Idaho Code § 54-2057.

12

Whether Maclay was in the process of obtaining Kucera's Help-U-Sell franchise and

13

whether Maclay was qualified or permitted to CatTY on Kucera's Help-U-Sell in Washington has no

14

bearing on whether Maclay was qualified to canyon Kucera's Help-U-Sell in Idaho. Idaho layv

15

requires Maclay to be a licensed broker in Idaho to canyon the responsibilities of a business's work
16

in Idaho, and Maclay admits that he was not a licensed broker in Idaho. Because Maclay was nol a
17
18

licensed broker, because a licensed broker was not appointed to can'y on Kucera's Help-U-Sell

19

business in Idaho, and because the Idaho license for Kucera's Help-U-Sell in Idaho had been

20

terminated, Maclay lacked the legal right to carryon the business activities of Help-U-Sell in Idaho.

21

Nevertheless, Maclay used the Help-U-Sell website to advertise Idaho real estate and not all of the

22

Idaho Real Estate was listed as FSBO. This evidence supports a finding that Maclay was calTymg

23

on Help-U-SeWs business in Idaho in violation of Idaho Code § 54-2040.
24

5

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - PAGE 9

00053

2. Idaho Code § S4-20S0(1)(a) and (c)
1
2

The hearing officer also found that Maclay violated subsections (a) and (c) of Idaho Code

*

3

54-2050(1) because the Smith, Wanner, and Jackson seller representation agreements did not

4

contain all of the information required by law. Maclay does not deny that these agreements were

5

incomplete but instead argues that Runkle was responsible for the omissions.

6

Maclay further

contends that Runkle never told him to do anything different.

7

A seller representation agreement must contain "[c]onspicuous and definite beginning and
8

expiration dates" as well as the "[p]rice and terms." Idaho Code § 54-2050(l)(a), (c). Brokers bear
9

10

the ultimate responsibility for making sure seller representation agreements are complete and

11

conform to Idaho law, but sales agents who enter into the agreements with sellers on behalf of a

12

broker also bear this responsibility. See Idaho Code §§ 54-2002, 54-2038(1), 54-2048, 54-2050.

13

14

Regardless of whether a broker informs a sales agent of the sales agent's statutory
responsibilities regarding seller representation agreements, Idaho's real estate law informs sales

15

agents that they must include certain information in seller representation agreements, and sales
16

agents are obligated to follow the law. The evidence indicates that Maclay was appointed the sales
17
18

agent for the Smith agreement and that he voluntarily became the sales agent for the Jackson

19

agreement. As the responsible sales agent, Maclay had the responsibility of making sure that the

20

seller representation agreements included all of the information required by law. Because there is

21

uncontested evidence in the record that the Wanner, Jackson, and Smith agreements were missing

22

required information and that Maclay acted as the agent for these sellers, there is sufficient evidence

23

to support a finding that Maclay violated Idaho Code § 54-2050 by not ensuring that the seller
24

representation agreements were complete.
25

26
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1
2

3. Idaho Code § 54-2053(2), (4)

3

The hearing officer found that Maclay violated Idaho Code § 54-2053(2) by advertising

4

listed properties without listing the broker's licensed business name and by using a new brokerage

5

name without prior approval by the Commission with respect to Treaty Rock listings on the Help-lJ-

6

Sell website. In addition, the hearing officer found that Maclay violated Idaho Code § 54-2053(4)

7

by providing misleading information with respect to the Treaty Rock listings on the Help-lJ-Scli
8

website. Maclay claims that he was posting Treaty Rock listings on his Washington Help-U-Sell
9

10
11

12

13

14

website, not on an Idaho Help-U-Sell website, and that he used proper "disclosures" which made the
listings "perfectly acceptable and proper."
Real estate in Idaho must be advertised through a broker licensed in Idaho or through a sales
agent licensed in Idaho and designated by an Idaho broker. Idaho Code § 54-2053( 1 ).

All

advertisements for Idaho real estate must contain the name of the licensed Idaho broker and must

15

not contain information that is misleading to the public, prospective customers, or clients. Idaho
16

Code § 54-2053(2), (4). If the Idaho broker changes business names, the new business name "shall
17

18
19
20
21

22

not be used or shown in advertising unless and until a proper notice of change in the business name
has been approved by the commission." Idaho Code § 54-2053(2).
Even if Maclay had an interim broker's license in Washington that allowed him to use HelpU-Sell in Washington, Maclay did not have a broker's license in Idaho that allowed him

to

use

Help-U-Sell to advertise Idaho real estate. After Help-U-Sell's license in Idaho was term1l1ated,

23

Maclay obtained a sales agent license under Swanson, the broker at Treaty Rock, and this license
24

gave Maclay legal standing to advertise Idaho real estate through Treaty Rock. However, Swanson
25

was not affiliated with Help-U-Sell, and the Commission did not authOlize Treaty Rock to become
26
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affiliated with or otherwise change its name to Help-U-Sell. As a result, Maclay did not have legal
1

2

standing to advertise Treaty Rock listings on Help-U-Sell's website regardless of whether the Help-

3

U-Sell website was a Washington or an Idaho website. Because there is evidence that Maclay

4

advertised Treaty Rock listings on Help-U-Sell's website, though there was no affiliation between

5

the two entities and no official name change, and because there is evidence that Maclay did not

6

always include the broker's name, there is sufficient evidence to support a finding that Maclay

7

violated Idaho Code § 54-2053(2) and (4).
8
9

4. Idaho Code § 54-2054(9)

10
11

The hearing officer found that Maclay violated Idaho Code § 54-2054(9) by accepting real

12

estate fees not paid through the broker for the performance of acts requiIing a real estate license.

13

Maclay does not deny that he accepted up front marketing fees but instead argues that these fees are

14

not subject to the Commission's oversight.

He contends that "[s]imply posting notice that a

15

propelly is for sale-... whether through a sign in the yard, an advertisement in the paper, or a
16

description in a multiple listing service-requires no special skill or training and thus

IS

not

17
18

something that does or should require a real estate license." In support of his position, Maclay relies

19

on an opinion letter written by Kucera in which Kucera concludes that listing property on an FSBO

20

website is not an acti vity requiring a real estate license and that a licensee may accept a marketing

2

fee for such an activity. (Respondent's Ex. A.)

2
23

In Idaho, a real estate license is required to sell, list,3 buy, or negotiate or to offer to sell, list,
buy or negotiate the purchase, sale, option, or exchange of real estate. Idaho Code §§ 54-2003(l)(a),

24
25

Rcal cstate is "listcd" if it is placed "for sale under an agreement with a real-estate agcnt or broker.·' (Black's Ll\V
Dictionary, 8th ed. 2004).

.1

26
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II

1

54-2004(33), (34). A license is also required to advertise Idaho real estate and to place a sign on

2

Idaho real estate. Idaho Code § 54-2053(1). A person who engages in any of these actions engages

3

in the business of real estate and must be licensed as a broker or be licensed under a broker as a

4

salesperson. Idaho Code § 54-2002.

5

However, a person is exempt from this license requirement if the person is taking action to

6

sell his own personal property. Idaho Code § 54-2003(l)(a). A property owner may independently
7

advertise personal property in a newspaper or on a website without having a license or working
8

through a licensed brokerage because the owner is not engaging in the business of real estate. ld.
9

Companies that merely provide resources for property owners to create and list their own

10
11

advertisements are also exempt from the license requirement because they are not engaging the

12

business of real estate within the meaning of Idaho's real estate law. See Idaho Code ~* 54-2002,

13

54-2004(5). These types of companies may publish advertisements in a magazine or on a website

14

because they do not act as agents of the property owner or otherwise provide any assistance to the

15

owner.

For example, an FSBO company is simply a vehicle by which owners independently

16

advertise and market their own personal real estate. Such a company does not assign agents to
17
18
19

listings, and as the name of the company indicates, owners take complete responsibility for the
advertisements.

20

Once a third party becomes involved with the sale of real property by entering into an

21

exclusive representation agreement with an owner and taking action on behalf of an owner, the

22

exemption from the license requirement no longer applies because the third party is acting as an

3

agent or salesperson. A third party who creates an advertisement, lists property in MLS, and places
24

a sign in the yard with a third party's phone number is doing more than simply allowing a seller to
25

26
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1
2

communicate with others; he is engaging in the business of real estate. See Idaho Code SS 54-2004,
54-2053.

3

If an agent acts on behalf of an owner by engaging in any of the activities listed in S 54-2004

4

or S 54-2053, any fees assessed for these activities must be paid to the designated broker, not the

5

agent. Idaho Code § 54-2054(9). "All fees must be paid through broker. No sales associate shall

6

accept any commission, compensation or fee for the performance of any acts requiring a real estate

7

license from any person except the real estate broker with whom the sales associate is licensed." /£1.
8

In this case, there is undisputed evidence that Maclay did more than just post advenisements
9

10

of propeny on a website; he acted as an agent by entering into exclusive seller representation

11

agreements, posting property on MLS, and placing signs in yards that contained his phone numbcr,

12

not the phone numbers of the sellers. There is also undisputed evidence that the flat fees assessed

13

for these activities were paid directly to Maclay. Because Maclay's activities were those requiring a

14

license and because the fees for these activities were not paid to the broker, the evidence supports a

15

finding that Maclay violated Idaho Code § 54-2054.
16
1~

~

I

18

5. Idaho Code § 54-2060(2), (3), (11), (12)

19

The hearing officer found that Maclay violated Idaho Code S 54-2060(2), (3), (11). and (12)

20

by engaging in a continued or flagrant course of misrepresentation, by not accounting for or

21

remitting money belonging to the brokerage, by dealing dishonestly or dishonorably, and by

22

23

engaging in gross negligence or reckless conduct. Maclay contends that he at all times acted in
good faith and with an effort to abide by the rules. He accuses the Commission of basing its

24

conclusions on perceptions and not the facts, and he claims in his reply that the hearing officer
25

abused his discretion by not giving any weight to Maclay's evidence.
26
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1

2

Pursuant to Idaho Code § 54-2060, the following acts shall constitute misconduct:

(2)

Engaging in a continued or flagrant course of
misrepresentation or making of false promises, whether done
personally or through agents or salespersons ...

(3)

Failure to account for or remit any property, real or personal,
or moneys coming into the person's possession which belong
to another ...

(11)

Any other conduct whether of the same or a different character
than hereinabove specified which constitutes dishonest or
dishonorable dealings ...

(12)

Gross negligence or reckless conduct in a regulated real estate
transaction. Conduct is grossly negligent or reckless if, when
taken as a whole, it is conduct which substantially fails to meet
the generally accepted standard of care in the practice of real
estate in Idaho.

3
4

5
6
7

8
9

10
11
12

In this case, Maclay's conduct supports a finding that Maclay engaged in a continued or
13

flagrant course of misrepresentation. Maclay's continued use of Kucera's Idaho brokerage and
14
15

website, listing Treaty Rock properties on that website after Maclay had been asked to remove the

16

listings and also despite the lack of permission from Help-U-Sel\,-+ SUppOt1S a finding that Maclay

17

acted dishonestly or dishonorably. Maclay's failure to turn over flat fees to RealTeam for licensed

18

work supports a finding that Maclay did not account for or remit money belonging to the brokerage.

19

Maclay's preparation of exclusive representation agreements while unlicensed, Maclay's failure to

20

ensure that agreements were completely filled out, and Maclay's listing of the Krivor properties in
21

MLS while unlicensed supports a finding that Maclay engaged in gross negligence or reckless
22

23

conduct. None of these findings relate to Maclay's primary concern, the nat fee an'angement.

24

25

26
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6. Idaho Code §§ 54-2065 and 54-2002
2

Finally, the hearing officer found that Maclay violated Idaho Code §§ 5--1--2065 and 5--1--2002

3

by acting as a real estate sales agent and posting Idaho properties on Help-U-Sell though Maclay

4

\\'as not licensed through Help-U-Sell and Help-U-Sell was not a licensed brokerage.

Again.

Maclay claims that he had been working with an individual from Help-U-Sell's corporatc officc and
6

that a transfcr of Help-U-Sell from Kucera to Maclay was in the works.

7

A person who engages in the business or acts in the capacity of a sales agent in Idaho
8

without a license is in violation of Idaho's real estate law and is subject to both civil and criminal
9

10

penalties. Idaho Code §§ 54-2002, 54-2059, 54-2065. The commission may conduct invcstigations

11

and administrative proceedings, and if it finds that a person acted without a rcquired liccnsc, the

l2

Commission may impose a civil penalty in an amount not greater than $5,000.00 for a violation of

13

Idaho Codc § 54-2002. Idaho Code § 54-2059:

14

100 Idaho 96, 98, 593 P.2d 1000, 1003 (1979).

Stair of IdallO

Real Estate

COIllIll '/I

v. Parkillson.

Conversely, the Statc may file a misdemeanor

15

charge against a person for acting without a required license, and if the person is found guilty, the
16

court may punish that person "by a fine of not to excecd five thousand dollars ($5,000), or by
17
18
19

imprisonment in the county jail for a term not to exceed one (1) year, or by both." Idaho Code § 542065.

20

The evidence in this case is undisputed that Maclay was advertising Idaho real estate listcd

21

with Treaty Rock on Help-V-Sell's website after Help-U-Sell's Idaho license and Maclay's Hclp-UScll liccnse had been telminated. Because Maclay was no longer licensed in Idaho through Hclp-D-

23

Sell and because the law requires him to be licensed through Help-V-Sell in order to advcl1isc Idaho
24

25

Although a deal may have been in the works. there is no evidence that a deal had been reached at the time Maclay used
the website.
4

26
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1

real estate through Help-U-Sell, Maclay's continued use of Help-U-Sell to adve11ise Treaty Rock

2

lIstings supports a finding that Maclay violated Idaho Code § 54-2002 by acting without a license.

3

This finding provides a basis for the Commission to impose a civil penalty. The Commission did

4

not impose criminal penalties.

5

6

CONCLUSION

7

For the reasons stated above, the Court affirms the Commission's decision.
8

IT IS SO ORDERED.
9

10

Dated this ""-'-'''---_ day of June, 2010.

11
12
13

14

15
16
17
18

19
20
21
22
23
24

25
26
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
1

3
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pursuant to Rule 77(d) LR.C.P. to each of the attorneys of record in this cause in envelopes
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4
5
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7
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BOISE, ID 83702

9
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11

12
13

14
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Clerk of the District Court
Ada County, Idaho

15
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r

f

Date:
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19
20
21
22
23
24

25
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ichael Scott Maclay
etitioner (Pro Se)
304 N. Park Road
pokane Valley, WA 99212
509) 714-7974

4

5
6
7

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 4th JUOICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

8
9

Michael Scott Maclay,
Case No. CVOC0907296

10
11

12

Petitioner/Appellant

vs

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Idaho Real Estate CommiSSion,

13

Res ondentiRes on dent

14
15

0: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, IDAHO REAL ESTATE COMMISSION,

16

AND YOUR ATTORNEY, KIRTLAN G. NAYLOR AT NA YLOR & HALES, P.C.,

17

Attorneys at Law,

950 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 610, Boise, 10 83702

Telephone No. (208) 383-9511, Fax No. (208) 383-9516, AND THE CLERK 0
18

THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT

19

20

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT

21
The above named appellant, Michael Scott Maclay, apPQals against the above-

22

amed respondent, Idaho Real Estate CommiSSion, to the Idaho Supreme Court from

23

he MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER entered in the above-entitled action on

24

he 28 day of June, 2010, Honorable Judge, Kathryn A. Sticklen, presiding.

25

th

oticc of Appeal - 1

26
27
28

OOO{i3

02/10

01/23/2002

23: 23
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I

Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and th
2
3

emorandum Decision and Order described in the preceding paragraph
ppealable order under and pursuant to Rule (11 (a)(2)) or (12(a))] tA.R.

4

5

A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the Appellant then intend
o assert in the appeal, as attached to this Notice and by this reference incorporate

6

7

erain; provided, however that this list of issues on appeal shall not prevent th
ppellant from asserting other issues on appeal

8
9

A reporter's transcript of the Hearing on May 18, 2010, is requested at this time,

nly if the Court grants Appellant's Motion for a Waiver of Fees and Costs, which Motio
10

ccompanies this Notice of Appeal. .

11

12
13

Appellant also requests that the record include all documents automaticall
ncluded under Rule 28, I. A. R.

14

15

Furthermore, Appellant, Michael Scott Maclay, certifies as follows:

16

17

]8

Appellant is exempt from paying the transcript fee, cost to produce the record,
nd the filing fee herein because he is indigent as established by motion and affidavit,
nd the order, previously filed In this case. The previous Order waived the requiremen

19

f Appellant paying for the cost of the transcript of the Agency proceeding (Initia

20

earing) but not the filing fee, and Appellant simply motions the Court at this time t

2)

Iso waive the payment of the filing fee for this appeal as well as the cost to produce th

22

ourt and/or agency record for this appeal.

23

Service has been made upon Respondent pursuant to Rule 20, I. A. R.

24
25

otice of Appeal - 2

26

27
28

O()OG4

03/10

01/23/2002

23:23
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Respectfully submitted this ~ day of August 2010.
1
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#Och«/ ~nifr~t

3

MICHAEL seC) ACiA~
APPELLANT/PETITIONER

4

5
6

7

tate of Washington
ounty of <:::),X6\-~~1:...

)
) 55.

)

8
ICHAEL SCOTT MACLAV, being sworn, deposes and says:
9

That I am the appellant in the above-entitled appeal, and that all statements in

10

his notice of appeal, including the attached list of issues for appeal. are true and correct

11

o the best of my knowledge and belief.

12

13

MICHAEL SeQ

M CLA ,APPELLANT

14

15

ubscribed and Sworn to before me this \...o~

day of August 2010.

16

17

Notary Public

18

State of Washington
KIM 0 KASEY

19

MY COMMISSION EXPIRES
March 06, 2011

20

Nota

Public,

State of Washington, County of Spokane
My Commission Expires: 3/ \.c. I ~ \

21

22
23
24

25

'oLice of Appca1- 3

26
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01/23/2002
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PAGE

PRELIMINARY LIST OF ISSUES ON APPEAL

3

1. Appellant did raise the issue of arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion a

4

part of his Petition for Judicial Review, asserting many times over that th

5

Respondent and the Administrative Hearing Officer ignored evidence presente
by Appellant of his Broker's knowledge and tacit encouragement of his marketin

6

practices, as well as other evidence presented that Appellant was cooperatin

7

with the Agency and was in compliance with Idaho real estate agency la

8

following the death of his Idaho Broker.

9

2. Appellant further asserts, as an issue on appeal, that the Respondent's action
are in violation of and in excess of statutory and administrative authority, in tha

10

Respondent does not have jurisdiction over marketing fees, and more importantl

11

that Appellant's Broker is responsible for his acts and gave approval to the act

12

relating to the marketing fees.

13
14

3. Appellant further assets as an issue on appeal that there is no limit on th
number of broker associations an agent may have so that the listing an
marketing of properties on web-site showing both Washington and Idaho listing

15

16
17

18

and different listing agencies is permitted, thus Appellant was not in violation

0

any Idaho law in so doing.
4. The Court's ruling in effect has a chilling, anti-competitive effect on the rea
estate industry and thus limits Idaho citizens' freedom of choice in deciding he
to market their real estate for sale.

19

5. The punishment does not fit the crime.

Examining each individual allegatio

20

against Appellant, as separate events, shows how little substance there t

21

Respondent's concems.

22

requirement under Idaho law that marketing fees be paid through the broker, a

23
24

25

A Broker who signed off on the marketing fees: n

unSigned form or two, a matter of a few weeks of relative inactivity following th
death of a broker, listing property on a website that had listings for multipl
agencies in both Washington and Idaho-which conduct is entirely permitte
iOlicc of Appeal - 4

26

27

28
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under Idaho law-speak volumes about the relatively harmless nature

0

Appellant's alleged misconduct, yet Respondent has come down on Appellan
2

like he has committed the most despicable of acts. Given the benign nature

0

J

Appellant's course of conduct, the revocation of his Idaho real estate license an

4

the imposition of a large civil fine and other costs is in gross excess
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0

Respondent's statutory authority.

ppellant argued these issues to District Court, to no avail, and consequently seeks thi
ppeal
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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hereby certify that on the ;/ day of August, 2010, 1 caused to be served, by fa
ransmission, a true and correct copy of this Notice of Appeal upon Respondent'
ttorney:

13

16

Irtlan G. Naylor
aylor and Hales,' P.C.
SO W Bannock Street, Ste. 610
olse, 10 83702
ax: 1-208-383-9516
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ated this _ _ _ day of August 2010.
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MICHAEL SCOff~LA
APPELLANT
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

MICHAEL SCOTT MACLAY,
Appellant/Petitioner,

Case No. CVOC0907296

vs.
lDAHO REAL ESTATE COMMISSION,

ORDER FOR WAIVER
OF COSTS ON APPEAL

Respondent/Respondent.

Having reviewed the Appellant's Motion for Waiver of Appeal Transcript Fees on
the above captioned case, and being advised in the premises;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Idaho Code §31-3220, that the costs of
the fol!owing/::>hall be waived:
(0/

Filing Fee

(

Clerk's Record

(

Reporter's Transcript

The cost of the clerk's record shall be paid from the DistIict Court Fund.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this

->--_

day of August, 2010.

Senior Dis~Iict Judge

ORDER RE: WAIVER OF FEES
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
~~-

I hereby ceJ1ify that on August

2010, I have delivered a true and accurate

copy of the foregoing document to the following parties in the method indicated below:

MICHAEL SCOTT MACLAY
3304 N. PARK ROAD
SPOKANE VALLEY, WA 99212
KIRTLAN G. NAYLOR
NAYLOR & HALES, PC
950 W BANNOCK, STE 610
BOISE, ID 83702
APPEALS OFFICE
ADA COUNTY COURTHOUSE
VIA: INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL
J. David Navano
Clerk

0006~J
ORDER RE: WAIVER OF FEES
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
MICHAEL SCOTT MACLAY,
Supreme Court Case No.3 7946
Petitioner-Appellant,
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

vs.
IDAHO REAL ESTATE COMMISSION,
Respondent-Respondent on Appeal.

I, J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the
State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify:
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the
course of this action.
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the following documents will be submitted as EXHIBITS to
the Record:
1. Agency Record, filed May 29,2009.

2. Transcript of Hearing Held November 5, 2008, Idaho Real Estate Commission, Boise,
Idaho, received October 7,2009.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court this 30th day of September, 2010.

J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Court

By________________~~~
Deputy Clerk
CERTlFICA TE OF EXHIBITS
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICTOF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
MICHAEL SCOTT MACLAY,
Supreme Court Case No. 37946
Petitioner-Appellant,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

vs.
IDAHO REAL ESTATE COMMISSION,
Respondent-Respondent on Appeal.

I, J. DAVID NAVARRO, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of
the following:
CLERK'S RECORD
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows:

MICHAEL S. MACLAY

KIRTLAN G. NAYLOR

APPELLANT PRO SE

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

SPOKANE VALLEY, WASHINGTON

BOISE, IDAHO

J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Court

Date of Service: ----------------

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

MICHAEL SCOTT MACLAY,
Supreme Court Case No. 37946
Petitioner-Appellant,
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD

vs.
IDAHO REAL ESTATE COMMISSION,
Respondent-Respondent on Appeal.

I, J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing
record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true
and correct record of the pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28
of the Idaho Appellate Rules, as well as those requested by Counsels.
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the
6th day of August, 2010.

J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Court

CERTIFICATE TO RECORD
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